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Abstract 
 
How did the UK Chancellor of the Exchequer (the British Minister of Finance) publicly construct the economy after the 
Financial Crash, and why?  Chancellor Alastair Darling’s (2007-2010) rhetoric indicates how political elites represented 
the post-crash world for both themselves and subalterns.  In his annual budget statements to Parliament, Darling talked 
about finance and mortgages much more, and taxation much less, than other chancellors.  He constructed a vigorous 
defence of the financial sector and mortgage market, and comfortably described limited technical reforms.  But as well 
as avoiding taxation as a topic, he appeared less comfortable and more inconsistent defending his taxation policies in 
public.  Refusing to increase corporate or capital gains taxes, in his later budgets he argued that top-percentiles earners 
must pay more income tax, and that banks and tax evaders would pay more tax someday.  This is a surprising elite 
characterization of top earners and taxation two and one years before Occupy would encamp at St. Paul’s, which 
indicates that Darling understood the power of anti-elite critique.  I argue that in his speech Darling was willing to 
sacrifice some limited and select elements of financial activity and taxation to criticism in order to protect fundamental 
aspects of the financial system, particularly the owned capital upon which it depends. Via an appropriation critical 
language about finance and the Crash, his rhetoric defensively protected owned capital and corporate profit from other 
claims. 
 
Introduction       
 
 How did the UK chancellor publicly construct the economy after the Financial Crash, and why might he have 
chosen such representations?  Much has been written about how elites publicly presented antecedents, explanations, and 
prescriptions, and many have argued that elites created discursive frameworks to protect established neo-liberal projects 
and themselves.  In this paper I drill deep down within the discursive – all the way down to the rhetorical – and uncover 
more detail about how elite rhetoric worked, in the operational sense.   I investigate an emblematic sample of the British 
Minister of Finance’s description of the economy, considering what sorts of materials he used and how he assembled 
them.  Understanding how Alastair Darling constructed the post-Crash world between 2007 and 2009 illuminates which 
kinds of strategies elites can and do use to understand, express and protect themselves in uncertain times.  
 In many ways, Darling constructed the sort of vigorous defence of finance, mortgage access, and capital 
taxation that one would expect of a G7 Minister of Finance post-2008.  He argued that the financial sector was a public 
good, that mortgage access must be guaranteed, and that capital gains and corporate profits should not increase.  Darling 
was broadly reluctant to discuss taxation at all, as a recession took hold, and as a general election loomed.  But the 
Crash had amplified critiques of finance and its elites were amplified in the public sphere, and Darling was compelled 
to respond to vigorous public challenges to the status quo.  With his rhetoric Darling strategically utilized those 
critiques of finance and of elites by calling for (very limited) reform of the financial sector, emergency measures for the 
mortgage market, and increases in income taxation for the top one-, two- and five-percent of earners.  In order to 
improve the credibility of his account, Darling made anti-elite concessions to criticism in finance and taxation.  I argue 
that this credibility was not only politically useful for Darling, but had political-economic use as well, because it 
sacrificed small amounts of elite privilege to protect fundamental aspects of the financial system, specifically the owned 
capital upon which so much debt was secured.  Darling responded to external challenges to finance and elite taxation by 
   
incorporating that criticism into his constructions, sacrificing smaller matters in order to defend more fundamental 
issues.  His defensive constructions appropriated incomplete, limited and closely-controlled popular arguments against 
finance and against unequal wealth, better to protect capital assets. 
 
Finance, the Crash and the UK State 
 
 Elite representations of the causes and consequences of the Financial Crash have largely involved technocratic 
fixes that support the maintenance of the financial system.  Englen et. al. (2011) have argued that policy makers and 
academics adjudicated on the crisis as either: (1) accidental structural failures between complex systems, or (2) political 
and economic elites driven by self-interest, or (3) an intermediate position, in which agents took relatively innocent 
decisions within which unforeseen risks lay.  They have also observed that experts recommended technical fixes rather 
than address broader challenges.  Whittle and Mueller (2011) have proposed two main public narratives of Treasury 
Committee questioners and UK banking executives: bankers as villains causing the Crash vs. bankers as victims who 
had been doing their best to create prosperity.  Riaz, Buchanan and Bapuji (2011) have found that academic and 
financial elites have recommended technical changes in either government policy or in banking practices, respectively, 
while regulatory elites mostly recommended maintaining the existing system, and all three groups implied tacit support 
of existing institutions.  Other political economists have gone further, arguing that the established neo-liberal order that 
had benefited elites for decades has not only endured the Crisis, but prospered in its wake (Crouch, 2011; Mirowski 
2014). 
 We may take two proxies to gain some insight into the criticisms of finance specifically and capitalism in 
general, post-Crash.  The first is the work of academic critics of the growing dominance of finance over other types of 
economic activity, which had existed before but gained a wider audience now.  Scholars like Lapavistas (2008), 
Skidelsky and Joshi (2009), and Shiller (2009) wrote in broadsheets like The Guardian and The Financial Times not 
only that financial regulation was poor, but that finance had de-coupled from the real economy in destructive ways, that 
inequality and debt could be detrimental to economic growth, and that economic stimuli other than tax cuts were needed 
now.  The second proxy is the Occupy movement, which arose formally more than a year after Darling left post, but 
reflected ideas that had circulated prior.  Echoing the aforementioned economists, Occupy protesters would soon 
demand more wealth equality (Holmer Nadeson 2013), especially a more equitable system of taxation (Barnes 2013) 
and an economy that did not rely so heavily on mercurial finance (Ho 2012).   
 The intense and symbiotic relationship between the UK Treasury and the UK state has been well-argued 
argued for decades (Fine and Harris, 1985; Glyn, 2006; Ingham 1984).  Susan Strange (1988) defined the financial 
system itself as the interdependency and, ultimately, cooperation, between banks, markets, and the fiscal and financial 
arms of the state (particularly the Treasury and central bank).  Financialization – the rise and rise of finance since the 
1970s – has brought new challenges for politics and economics, as finance has become socially privileged over other 
economic activities.  During this epoch states and banks have cooperatively innovated to expand credit (Konings, 2011; 
Schwartz, 2008), increasing numbers of people participated in mundane finance, via savings and debt (Langley 2008), 
and governments successfully reaped both economic and political rewards of their participation (Seabrooke, 2006).  
While finance has become a more powerful elite domain, its ubiquity has also widened the stakes for all, and its Crisis 
has invited widespread criticism.  
 The tumultuous financial events that dominated Darling's chancellorship also deserve brief review.  In Summer 
2007 the US mortgage-securitization market came unglued, and in September 2007 Darling rescued UK bank Northern 
   
Rock from a run, first by granting it emergency funds, then by nationalizing it (Shin 2009).  By Autumn 2008 Darling 
had rescued four more banks and announced the availability of a ￡25 Billion recapitalization fund (UK Parliament 8 
Oct 2008).  In January 2009 Darling authorized the Bank of England to create liquidity by exchanging bonds for bank 
assets (Bank of England 2010).  Despite widespread calls for financial-sector reforms, fundamentally very little changed 
in terms of the Government's macro-economic policies, the structure and governance of financial institutions, or the 
instruments that financial instruments were permitted to sell (Froud et al 2010; Hodson and Mabett 2009).  But a 
lingering consequence of the Crisis was the effect it had on state balance sheets. By late 2009 at least ￡850 billion had 
been spent by HM Treasury to support UK banks, a tally which did not include quantitative easing activity at the Bank 
of England (National Audit Office 2009), which by February 2010 had spent ￡200 billion purchasing (mostly) UK 
government gilts from UK banks (Joyce et al 2010).  Thus, by the end of Darling's tenure, over a trillion pounds had 
been extended by the UK government to the financial sector, and the Bank's balance sheet was three times its pre-Crisis 
size as a proportion of GDP (Cross, Fisher and Weeken 2010). 
 How does criticism of finance, and elite response to it, fit into this larger political-economic picture?  For an 
explanation I draw on The New Spirit of Capitalism (2005) in which Luc Boltanski and Éve Chiapello have posited a 
model for the evolution of modern capitalism through mechanisms of political and civil feedback, arguing that anti-
capitalist critique has contributed to the vibrancy and resilience of contemporary capitalism.  According to Boltanski 
and Chiapello, capitalism has responded to popular challenge by either evading or absorbing critique, proving resilient 
to challenge via adapting to select social challenges.  In their analysis, French capitalism responded to the 1968 
students' strikes in part by incorporating a language of “freedom” and “creativity” into capitalist discourses, and 
subsequently a “creative class” into elite ranks, which allowed an evasion of the critique of workers' pay and thereby 
foiled that threat to accumulation.  In this paper I will argue something similar, but on a much smaller scale: after the 
Crash Alastair Darling used popular criticism of the financial system and financial elites in his rhetoric, and actively 
responded to it, such that the fundamental base of the financial system – asset capital – was protected. 
 
Investigating Budget Rhetoric 
 
 According to the Treasury's own publicity, “chancellors use the Budget statement to update Parliament and the 
nation on the state of the economy, on the public finances and on progress against the Government's economic 
objectives” (HM Treasury, 2013).  These two audiences – Parliament and the nation – (themselves not even distinct) are 
comprised of as many sub-audiences as one might like to define.  Darling speaks to all these audiences simultaneously, 
as well as international markets and policy-makers, but he is speaking to and for other elites especially, building an 
account for and about them.  I believe this partly because Darling and his Treasury aides are elites themselves, creating 
meaning from their own experiences, but also because empirical studies suggest that budget statements should be 
especially meaningful for other elites (Hellwig and Coffey 2011; Schneider and Jacoby 2005).  For all audiences, 
budget statements deliberately communicate the Government's preferred economic narrative and accompanying 
judgements, as progress toward preferred objectives is defined by the chancellor.  
 As rhetoric analysis is necessarily detailed and intense, I must select text carefully.  In order to select 
distinctive text, I use a computer-based quantitative content analysis to determine how Darling's budgets were most 
dissimilar from the chancellors whom preceded and succeeded him.  The annual budget statements delivered between 
1976 and 2013 (see Table One for chancellors, prime ministers, and political parties) makes a corpus of 396,328 words, 
and I investigate it using Antconc 3.2.4w, a free-ware, UNIX-based corpus analysis application, developed by Dr. 
   
Laurence Anthony of Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan, who holds copyright.  This allows me to identify n-grams 
(words and phrases) in Darling's budget statements that have an unusually high or low frequency in comparison with 
other budgets.  From a much larger list of n-grams associated with finance, fiscal matters, monetary measures, industry, 
and employment, I determined which shared n-grams (n-grams that every chancellor said at least once) appeared much 
more or much less often in Darling's budgets.   
 
 
Table One: UK Chancellors of the Exchequer, 1976-present 
Chancellor Years in Post Serving Prime Minister Political Party 
Denis Healey 1976-1979 Jim Callaghan Labour 
Geoffrey Howe 1979-1983 Margaret Thatcher Conservatives 
Nigel Lawson 1983-1989 Margaret Thatcher Conservatives 
John Major 1989-1990 Margaret Thatcher Conservatives 
Norman Lamont 1990-1993 John Major Conservatives 
Kenneth Clarke 1993-1997 John Major Conservatives 
Gordon Brown 1997-2007 Tony Blair Conservatives 
Alastair Darling 2007-2010 Gordon Brown Labour 
George Osborne 2010-present David Cameron Conservatives 
 
 My rhetoric analysis is based on a constructivist frameworks, in which rhetoric is employed to build credible 
and robust representations of reality.  Following Herrick’s (2009) indications, I think of rhetoric as: (1) planned (2) 
adapted to an audience, (3) a revelation of motives of both speaker and audience, (4) responsive, response-making, and 
response-inviting (5) a seeking to persuade, through argument, appeal, arrangement, and aesthetics, and (6) an address 
to issues of contingency and deliberation.  I then draw on work studying rhetoric as a matter of constructing credible 
accounts that can compete successfully against alternate accounts (Antaki and Horowitz 2000; Billig, 1996; Edwards 
and Potter, 1992) and especially Jonathan Potter's conception of rhetoric as “discourse used to bolster particular 
versions of the world and to protect them from criticism” (1996, p. 33) and “a feature of the antagonistic relationship 
between versions: how a description counters an alternative description, how it is organized, in turn, to resist being 
countered” (1996, p. 108).  My rhetoric analysis, then, is the analyst's act of scrutinizing how descriptions are organized 
to make them seem the more credible and objective to audiences than other versions. 
 Following Potter (1996), rhetoric often recommends an action, if only an active agreement with the speaker's 
version of reality, what he calls its action-orientation.  This may be done by explicitly asking, instructing, declaring, or 
demanding, but the more sensitive the suggestion, the more likely it is to be made by inference, implying a next best 
action.  If there is a 'dilemma of stake,' that compromises speaker trustworthiness, it is common to attempt to manage 
that appearance.  A speaker may also suggest an action through a categorization that maximizes, minimizes, or 
normalizes an object, while categorizations of “normal” and “routine” can be used to obscure speaker agency or 
environmental change.  Or a description may suggest an action by selectively managing the terrain of description, so 
that only some objects are admitted but not others, an “ontological gerrymandering” (Woolgar and Pawluch 1985) that 
shapes what is problematic and what is not.  Rhetoric also has an epistemological-orientation, which builds an account 
as credible.  The appearance of self-interest must be managed so that the account looks independent of vested interests, 
or true in spite of them.  Here Potter has borrowed Goffman's (1979) notion of footing, how closely/distantly a speaker 
presents himself or herself to the account, to build the appearance of veracity through accountability or to dodge blame.  
   
Rhetoric often uses empiricist discourse, and here Potter has borrowed Gilbert's and Mulkay's (1984) list of empirical 
features in scientific accounts: impersonal grammar, the primacy of data primacy, and presenting procedural rules that 
appear universal.  Speakers may make claims of consensus or corroboration, or vivid detail may be employed to make 
accounts appear more factual.  Alternatively, detail may be left vague so that the account is harder for others to 
undermine.  Narrative order can build an account by implying causation and temporal order.  Potter has noted that some 
of these procedures can work against one another and require trade-off; perhaps worst of all for politicians, many of the 
procedures that heighten veracity also heighten accountability (see also Stapleton and Hargie, 2011).  In the upcoming 
evidence sections, I will use these ideas to assess Darling's rhetoric. 
 Other published work in discourse studies will be helpful here.  Firstly, Antaki and Wetherall (1999) have 
proposed that “making a show” of conceding by a well-structured sequence of proposition-concession-reassertion can 
strengthen a speaker’s relative offensive position in an argument.  Show concessions do rhetorical work by introducing 
caricatures of the opposition’s case, or by reasserting the proposition as a reversal of the concession, or by devaluing 
some aspect of the proposition with the concession with a dismissive reassertion.  “[B]y making a show of the 
concessionary gift the speaker corrupts it” (Antaki and Wetherall 1999, p. 24), and this can help protect the perceived 
stake or interest of a speaker such as Darling.  Secondly, Finlayson (2006) conceptualizes political rhetoric in terms of 
setting the definition of problems and advancing arguments based on ideas, beliefs and meanings.  Darling certainly 
constructs problems with his budget statement rhetoric, although I emphasize just how he sets problems in order to 
manage problem-setting that he himself did not generate.  Thirdly, Fairclough and Fairclough (2011) have analysed the 
UK Treasury's 2008 Pre-Budget report in terms normative judgements of what politicians and audiences believe and 
want.  We share related data sets, but I rely less than they on whether the audience follows a rational progression in 
practical reasoning just as the speaker intended, in part because this is something that I simply cannot know.  Instead I 
keep my focus on my speaker's constructions, what versions of reality he was likely countering, and what his 
motivations may have been for doing so. 
  
 
Finance and Mortgages 
 
 Darling spoke of finance more than any of the other post-1976 chancellors (see Figure One), almost twice as 
often as either Brown or Osborne, and Darling’s 95% confidence interval clears all other error margins except John 
Major’s.  (Major is an anomaly among post-1976 chancellors as he only delivered one budget; his confidence intervals 
tend to be quite wide, so this should not be over-interpreted.)  The shared n-grams are “interest rates,” “market(s),” 
bank(s),” “shares,” “investors,” “mortgage,” “housing,” “debt,” “credit” (not “tax credit”), “capital,” equity,” “finance” 
(not “finance bill”), and “financial” (not financial year).  Given the unsettled financial climate that Darling finds himself 
in, it is reassuring that the n-gram list method generates this difference between Darling and other chancellors.     
 
 
   
 
 
 Darling's 2008 budget speech addressed finance with text approximately one-fifth the size of comparable text 
in 2009 or 2010, but still his commitment to the financial sector is clear.  He said that “we have maintained confidence 
and stability in the banking system” (UK Parliament 12 Mar 2008a) and that “we want to bring together investors and 
lenders with the Treasury, the Bank [of England] and the Financial Services Authority to find market-led solutions to 
strengthen these funding markets further” (UK Parliament 12 Mar 2008b).  Finance had not yet come under widespread 
criticism, but Darling was clear in his support.  In April 2009, with a well-publicized financial crash in the recent past, 
constructions that address perspectives critical of finance begin to enter Darling's budget, alongside his established 
defence.  The financial sector was still a crucial public good, but now one in need of reform: 
 
A successful economy needs a strong financial sector.  We do not want to throw away the many 
advantages that come from our position as a world centre for finance.  I intend that we retain that position.  
Hundreds of thousands of jobs across the United Kingdom depend on it.  We need to build trust in the 
banking system, and harness the strengths of the financial services sector for the benefit of society.  
Crucial to this is financial regulation (UK Parliament 22 Apr 2009a). 
 
The significant new claim in this account is that finance has great social worth, is for the “benefit of society,” is crucial 
to hundreds of thousands of jobs.  Darling implicitly admitted that trust has been lost and now promised to restore it 
with financial regulation.  He responded to widespread criticism of the sector – criticism that he does not explicitly cite, 
only implies – by incorporating its remedies into his description.  He sets the problem in terms of popular criticisms, but 
his account is tightly constricted by a larger insistence that banking is central, vital and good. 
 In 2010 Darling’s defence of banking only grew stronger in the face of implied criticism: 
 
There can be no return to business as usual for the banks, but we also must remember that their success is 
vital not just for the global economy but for Britain's future.  London is the world's leading financial 
centre. Across the country, the sector supports over a million jobs including in Edinburgh, Leeds, 
Manchester, Cardiff and other cities.  A healthy, strong financial services industry is essential for our 
long-term prosperity (UK Parliament 20 Mar 2010a).   
   
 
Darling alluded to criticisms of finance, but then immediately described how important the financial sector was, for a 
“million jobs” throughout Britain, responding to an implicit criticism that finance only benefited London.  Darling 
responded not just to calls for reform, but also to concerns about bankers’ bonuses and the cost of bank rescues for the 
public accounts: 
 
We will sell our shares in RBS and Lloyds, as well as Northern Rock, in a way that maximises value for 
the taxpayer and recoups the money we invested.  We intend to get all taxpayers' money back.  In the 
meantime, I can tell the House that the Treasury has already received over £8bn in fees and charges from 
the banks, in return for our support.  At the time of the pre-Budget Report I put in place a one-off 50 per 
cent tax on the excessive bonuses of bankers.  I made it clear that banks had a choice of whether to pay 
bonuses or not – but if they did, given the amount of taxpayer support that had been provided, I believed 
it was right that the country as a whole should benefit.  I can tell the House that that tax has raised £2bn – 
more than twice as much as was forecast.  (UK Parliament 24 Mar 2010b).   
  
In this construction, taxpayers are told that they will recoup on an investment, while banks have received the same 
funding as “support.”  Darling repeated the framework he had offered the year before, in which he chided the banks 
while insisting that they must be supported.   He was also careful to say “fees” and “charges” (not a tax) for banks, 
while bankers were paying a “one-off 50 per cent tax” (not a charge or fee), making a clear distinction between 
language for institutions and employees.  Note that this one-off tax is on individual income, not owned assets or 
institutions.  Darling worked hard to give the impression that he was responding to challenges, while changing very 
little indeed. 
 Darling was eager to talk about mortgages, again an expected reflection of elites’ fears for the housing market 
after the Crash.  Figure Two shows that Darling spoke of mortgage(s) significantly more often than all other post-1976 
chancellors (CI > 95%, save Norman Lamont, who presided over his own era of repossessions). 
 
 
 
Most of this attention was bestowed in 2009, when Darling described the repossession fears of mortgagees and 
announced that the state would pay mortgage interest in cases of unemployment.  Unspoken was lenders' fears of mass 
   
defaults, but I argue that Darling was also responding to their concerns, implicitly.  Darling continued to say that “the 
housing market is also being held back by a lack of mortgage credit,” and that: 
 
The recession and the credit crunch have made it much harder for people to take their first step on the 
housing ladder. This is not just difficult for those involved, but also undermines the entire housing 
market.  So, to help, I have decided to extend the stamp duty holiday on properties sold for less than 
£175,000 until the end of the year.  Sixty percent of residential properties will continue to be exempt, 
which will encourage modest and middle-income home buyers (UK Parliament 22 Apr 2009b).  
 
Darling’s construction takes into account criticisms from people who cannot afford mortgages, as well as home-owners 
worried that mass defaults would damage their own net worth, as “the entire housing market” is undermined.  Explicitly, 
he was happy to explicitly state the case for protecting the housing market, despite acknowledging those who felt ‘shut-
out.’  More importantly, he in no way challenged the financial trade in mortgage-credit or house prices, which had 
grown to many multiples more of income in the decade before.  These would be sustained via state subsidy as necessary.  
Again, Darling responded to criticisms, but only with small technical changes that maintained the market, and asset 
prices, while decreasing taxation on owned capital. 
 
Taxation 
 
 Darling exhibited a precipitous drop in tax talk, as demonstrated by Figures Three and Four, before talk of 
taxation returned to typical levels under Osborne.  Taxation (a word that Darling did not say once in three speeches) is a 
fundamental topic for budget speeches, so Darling’s reticence to speak about taxes is quite 
striking.
 
 
   
 
 
 In 2008 Darling made an emphatic defence of “non-doms,” wealthy UK residents who were not deemed 
resident for tax purposes in the UK:  
 
We welcome the contribution made by people born outside the UK who choose to come and work here. 
They are an important and central contributor to our economy’s growth and prosperity.  They pay taxes 
on their earnings here; they also pay tax on money they bring into the country from abroad.  But for those 
non-domiciled individuals or families who have chosen to make Britain their home, I believe that it is 
right and fair that they should, after 7 years, pay a reasonable charge to maintain the right to be taxed 
differently from other UK residents.  Beyond that, as I have said before, we will not seek to charge UK 
tax on offshore income or capital gains that are not brought into the UK.  This new charge will be 
implemented from April. There will be no further changes to this regime for the rest of this Parliament or 
the next [Interruption] (UK Parliament 12 Mar 2008c).   
 
The fact that Darling meets the criticism of non-doms’ favourable tax status not by direct citation but implicit 
construction makes the policy's contentiousness clear.  Even the Parliamentary Hansard recorder indicated the 
controversial nature of Darling’s decision by recording an “interruption” in the House.  Darling defined the terrain of 
the debate by categorizing the Treasury's compensation for offering this favourable tax status as “reasonable,” just as he 
declined to characterize the “charge” as a “tax.”  He makes a second categorization, suggesting with the phrase “no 
further changes” that his decision was routine.  He maintained a distant footing throughout by separating “I” and “we” 
from “they,” “those,” and “their,” a choice which manages his dilemma of stake as an elite, and managed his 
appearance of interests as the Chancellor.  Of the 150 words in this short passage, Darling spent the first 66 defending 
why the UK needs “contribution made” by non-doms “who choose to come and work.”  Crucially, the tax status of non-
doms did not fundamentally change, only a smaller adjustment was made.   
 In 2009 Darling's reluctant tax talk started to qualitatively change, as he began to characterize taxation as 
matter of top and bottom segments: 
 
I believe that it is fair that those who have gained the most should contribute more.  Only those with 
incomes over £100,000 a year – or 2 per cent of the population – will be affected.  In November, I 
announced a new rate of income tax of 45 per cent on incomes above £150,000 – the top one per cent of 
taxpayers.  In order to help pay for additional support for people now, I have decided that the new rate 
   
will be 50 per cent, and will come in from next April – a year earlier (UK Parliament 22 April 2009c). 
 
Darling implicitly responded to criticism of elite taxation by stating that “those who have gained the most should 
contribute more.”  He named the top one- and two-percent, gave great detail, and arranged the narrative so that first 
gains are cited, then penalties, making the case that this was “right” with narrative order.  Thus, two-and-a-half years 
before the Occupy movement's high-profile occupations began, Darling publicly constructed income taxation in terms 
of top-percentages. 
 This trend only grew stronger in 2010, as Darling described taxpayers as top one-, two-, and five- percent of 
earners: 
 
The 50 per cent rate of income tax will come in next month, but only affects those with earnings over 
£150,000 a year, the top 1 per cent of earners.  For people with incomes over £100,000 a year, the top 2 
per cent, we will gradually remove the value of their personal allowances.  Tax relief on pensions will be 
restricted from next year, but again only for those with incomes above £130,000 a year.  Looking across 
all the tax rises since the beginning of this global crisis, 60 per cent of them will be paid for by the top 5 
per cent of earners.  We have not raised these taxes out of dogma or ideology.  We are determined to 
ensure our overall tax regime remains competitive.  But I believe those who have benefited the most from 
the strong growth in incomes in past years should now pay their fair share of tax (UK Parliament 24 Mar 
2010c). 
 
Here Darling cited dogmatism, and that explicitness indicates that, in truth, the charge did not trouble him too deeply; in 
contrast, as he employs the euphemism of “competitiveness” to defend the existing low-tax system.  Corporation and 
capital gains tax remain untouched again in 2010, but small concessions were made in terms of the top-percentages of 
earners.  While income tax for top-percentiles was rising, taxes on owned capital were remaining the same, or 
decreasing. 
 In 2010 Darling brought banks, as institutions, into his tax-talk for the first time, explicitly reassuring his 
audience that the banks would be taxed worldwide, eventually: 
 
We cannot continue with a situation where the banks are rewarded for creating excessive risk, but the 
taxpayer foots the bill when things go badly.  More countries now agree on the need for an international 
systemic tax on banks.  This must be brought forward quickly, as I will urge international Finance 
Ministers in Washington next month.  I agree with all those who think that such a tax should be 
internationally co-ordinated. Going it alone, as some have suggested, would cost thousands of jobs, not 
just in London, but across the whole country (UK Parliament 24 Mar 2010a). 
 
This is significant, because Darling was now willing to concede that banks as institutions may need to pay more tax.  
But I interpret this as a hedged bet: while taxation is promised, international coordination on international taxation 
agreement is beyond Darling's control.  This is corroboration, but not as a reason to do something, rather as a reason to 
do nothing.  Darling's capacity to act domestically is not acknowledged in this account, he only alludes to the 
constraints of acting globally. Similarly, tax evaders were in his sights, but international cooperation was needed: 
 
While people are suffering hardship, it is all the more unfair that some are escaping their tax obligations. I 
am determined to continue our successful drive to prevent avoidance and evasion. Measures in this 
Budget will bring in additional tax worth half a billion pounds each year, while protecting £4bn worth of 
revenues by 2012-13. These steps include tax agreements like that already signed with Liechtenstein, 
which is expected to bring in around £1bn of extra revenue. I can also now tell the House that we are 
ready to sign tax information exchange agreements with three additional countries – Dominica, Grenada 
and Belize (UK Parliament 24 Mar 2010d). 
 
Darling constructed himself as tough on tax evaders and tax avoiders, but constrained by lack of international 
   
agreement so far.  His footing was close, he categorized “our successful drive” as potent and intentional, and he 
promised that he was “ready to sign” so that more could be done.  I argue that he could safely construct himself as 
active because nothing would actually happen to assets because of his speech.  What needed no international agreement, 
what he could actually change – capital and corporate tax rates within the UK – he would not raise in his budget speech 
of 2010. 
 
Discussion 
 
 Finance and the asset values that underpin the system are staunchly protected in Darling’s budgets, while 
critique is only admitted in a very limited fashion.  In 2008 he insisted that the financial sector would be protected and 
the global system maintained.  As the Financial Crisis worsened, Darling never retreated from this explicit position, 
instead he widened his defence of finance to include expressions about employment, the regions, and the public good.  
But by 2009 he added limited, controlled, criticism, specifically the incorporation of a message of regulatory reform.  
Like finance in general, mortgages in particular were protected.  Darling constructed mortgage jeopardy – that many 
mortgage holders were holding debt they struggled to pay – and characterized this explicitly as an anxiety for all 
property owners.  He answered criticism not with any suggestion that the housing market might be over-valued, but 
instead as a clear case for state support.  The construction of taxation also protected owned wealth, by sacrificing 
limited top-percentile income taxation.  Darling talked little about taxation, indicating that interventions in taxation – 
whether increasing or decreasing – were not his desire amidst financial upheaval.  In 2008, Darling’s construction of 
non-domiciled residents was very much defensive, a response to criticism but not a very conciliatory one.  But by 2009 
Darling began to admit criticism of elite taxation into his account of tax, but only implicitly, and only in terms of 
income tax.  Again in 2010, even though top-percentile earners and tax evaders were to pay more, capital gains tax and 
corporate tax were barely mentioned, and rates remained the same.  Darling was willing to admit criticism of the top 
percentiles of earned capital, but owned wealth was protected by being almost entirely omitted from the construction of 
tax. 
 There were other options, most easily seen in terms of the things I have argued Darling was reacting against.  
The state could have significantly re-regulated the financial sector, with the division between retail and investment 
banking re-instated.  Instead of cutting stamp duty in the first-time home-buyer's range, the government could have 
accepted that the UK housing market was over-valued and allowed market-forces to correct this.  Doing so arguably 
would have done as much for first-time buyer access.  The government could have administered a Tobin tax to retard 
the rates of financial transactions, as some EU leaders were advocating, or re-valued the council tax system, or levied a 
mansion tax (still an elusive policy measure at the time of writing).  Great lip-service was paid to supporting the “real 
economy” in the wake of the Crash, but very little was done, as the Brown Government still did not like to “pick 
winners,” despite re-energized Keynesians inside the Labour Party.  Darling's increases in top-earner taxes did not 
amount to a significant redistribution of wealth: owned wealth was untouched, off-shore wealth was untouched, and 
there was no distribution from, say, earners between 95% and 33% of incomes to the lowest third.  When Darling set 
the problems of finance, mortgages and taxation, his answers were like his rhetoric: measured, controlled, and of no 
significant challenge to elite constituencies. 
 Following Potter (1996) I argue that allowable criticisms built veracity in Darling’s account, made his account 
palatable for a range of audiences, and constructed elites as sensible and responsive to subaltern criticism.  
Incorporating criticisms into constructions that supported the status quo was a tactic to soften accounts of contentious 
   
issues.  His incorporation of criticisms of finance, mortgages, and especially taxation were attempt to inoculate himself 
against his stake as an elite, to increase his own appearance of trustworthiness, and construct himself as a vested interest 
only up to a defined point.  He managed his appearances of agency, accountability and activism with this tactic, and in 
turn attempted to manage the expectations of multiple audiences about what he could and would do.  The criticisms are 
softened by the fact that they remain largely allusions in the text, rather than being explicitly defined.  This softening 
helps Darling build a picture of consensus within his account, regardless of how much or little audience members agree 
on the role of finance, the mortgage market, or taxation in the Financial Crash.  Admitting these criticisms also 
facilitates “ontological gerrymandering” (Woolgar and Pawluch, 1985), as Darling constructed particular financial, 
mortgage and taxation activities as problematic while remaining silent on other activities.  Darling worked hard at these 
accounts, constructing his own activism and agency through categorization, close footing (Goffman 1979; 1981), detail, 
and narrative order where he wanted to construct his own agency.  Conversely, he used a lack of consensus and 
empiricist repertoire (Gilbert and Mulkay 1984) where he wished to look less culpable, especially in terms of tax talk.  
While this is problem-setting (Finalyson 2006), it is not a setting of Darling's choosing, rather these are responses that 
He was uncomfortably forced to make.  Darling made show concessions, specifically what Antaki and Wetherall (1999) 
have called a “sting in the tail,” in which Darling acknowledged a criticism (typically implicitly), and then addressed it 
with a very limited response.  
 With this rhetoric, Darling implicitly acknowledged criticisms of finance, including subaltern criticisms of elite 
taxation, yet financialized elites were reassured that fundamental change would not happen.  I argue that he sacrificed 
smaller issues of regulation in order to protect more fundamental aspects of how the financial system operated, 
specifically the capital value of assets upon which it is based.  In sociological terms, Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) 
have suggested that by incorporating selected critiques, capitalism has evaded other, more challenging critiques, and 
that this adaptive tendency has helped make capitalism robust.  I suggest here that Darling’s speeches after the Financial 
Crash can be viewed in a similar light, that his response to the Financial Crash was an observable example of a political 
elite enacting what Boltanski and Chiapello recognized as a broader historical trend.  Darling incorporated criticism into 
his constructions, but he simultaneously placed constraints around critiques of financialized capitalism.  Owned capital 
was protected and top-percentile earned income sacrificed; house prices would be protected even if mortgage payments 
had to be socialized; the banks should be re-regulated, but finance would remain central to the economy.  In short, 
Darling incorporated allowable critique in hopes of maintaining some control over larger and more fundamental 
narratives.  And this makes perfect sense, in light of the long-standing relationship between the UK Treasury and the 
City (Ingham, 1984; Strange 1988; Seabrooke, 2006), another example of the way that the state protects finance and 
financial capital, a system in and for which it is integral itself. 
 
Conclusion  
 
  Alastair Darling’s constructions after the Financial Crash were extraordinary in terms of how often he spoke 
about finance, mortgages and taxation, and how he responded rhetorically to the challenges of the Financial Crash.  
Darling protected finance and owned capital, but he was willing to construct finance as in need of reform, and even to 
penalize top-percentile earners.  He admitted critiques of finance, mortgage provision and taxation into his constructions 
as a means of building his own credibility and the credibility of his solutions.  My findings suggest that after the Crash 
elites incorporated in rhetoric select elements of criticism of finance and even themselves in an attempt to influence 
how the Crash and its criticisms were framed in public debate.  Alluding to limited criticism provided “cover” for more 
   
fundamental issues, and provided “balance” that attempted to appeal to a wide range of audiences, all while carefully 
managing expectations about the degrees to which finance would be reformed. 
 Affirming previous empirical findings about limited technocratic responses to the Financial Crash in terms of 
institutional reform, I add the observation that political elites are willing to sacrifice select elements of elite privilege in 
order to limit consideration of fundamental reforms to the economy.  I, too, find that Darling sought to defend what he 
described as the fundamental worth of finance, while recommending that the Crash be remedied through technological 
improvements to the existing architecture.  What I add with my analysis is that Darling utilized a dynamic criticism of 
financial, mortgage, and taxation activity in order to make the case that he was implementing remedies, and did so in a 
way that preserved these systems from fundamental critique within his account.  He was compelled to respond to the 
Financial Crash in some way, publicly, and he navigated this difficult problem by admitting criticisms, often implicitly, 
and always in a limited manner. In providing a budget narrative, Darling provided leadership to other elites, suggesting 
how they might present themselves, recommending that concessions to critique might be necessary in this new post-
Crash epoch.  My findings suggest that political elites are part of what Boltanski and Chiapello describe as capitalism’s 
ability to respond to and incorporate selected critiques while evading others, and that it may be political elites, rather 
than financial elites, who have been key.  Future work should consider this possibility more fully by comparing the two, 
as well as compare the rhetoric of Chancellors Brown and Osborne, who flank Darling in history but did not have to 
deal with an immediate, catastrophic, and high-profile financial crisis. 
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